>I can't see any reason as to why this was made.
A government-funded think tank is saying that the writing is on the wall for a NATO-aligned loss in Europe and that Washington should work for what's best for Washington rather than Kiev at this point, giving up on the overwhelming prioritization of Ukrainian humanitarian goals. It practically states that the Ukraine will be the world's welfare queen.
To summarize the paper in sections:
1. Non-strategic nuclear use is plausible, unlike what most who are against Russia think, because Russia sees the war as over the existence of itself and would be following plans that have already been revealed in case of a war against NATO. If NATO intervenes because of this, the situation likely escalates to strategic nuclear use. If NATO doesn't intervene, the world order is weakened because more non-strategic nuclear use will be normalized in the CSTO-sphere and warmed up to in those sympathetic to this sphere or at the fringes of the NATO-sphere.
2. If Russia has no way out, finds NATO fostering unrest in its borders, or a Russian missile accidentally flies off course into a neighboring NATO state, hot war between NATO and Russia is inevitable. This war would almost certainly be nuclear, and Russia would likely be the one to start the exchange due to its weakened conventional reserve.
3. Only if the Ukraine regained all of its territory, including Crimea, would the international norm for territorial claims be re-established, and this outcome is highly unlikely. If Russia is pushed back to its pre-invasion borders, it still holds Crimea and is in err of norms, weakening them because it shows that they still cannot properly be upheld. If Russia gains any land, the United States will harshly crackdown as a warning to other nations and punishment to Russia. However, this does nothing to fortify the norm for territorial claims. Regardless of how much land Russia takes, even in the unlikely case of them holding all of the Ukraine's coastline with the Black Sea, the Ukraine's economy will recover after a period of painful adjustment. It is most beneficial for the United States for the Ukraine to gain as much territory as possible, but this is not essential for the survival of either state. Additionally, the reconquest of any land, particularly that of the 2014 invasion, will drastically increase the chance of nuclear war and take years to accomplish, particularly due to Russia's defensive fortifications.
4. If the war lasts for years, Russia will not be able to use its force against others due to a preoccupation with the Ukraine. This will greatly weaken Russia and see the NATO-sphere cut off its energy dependence to the state. However, the further weakening of Russia's forces is likely very, very low due to the extent of existing losses, and many of the NATO-sphere will likely maintain energy dependence regardless of the war's length. While the NATO-sphere could also increase their own defense budgets along with this, helping the taxpayer, any state continuing energy dependence will likely do nothing about its defense budget. Prolonged war will likely see the dissolution of the Ukrainian economy, especially if Russian strikes against infrastructure continue. While there is a chance that prolonged war will give the Ukraine more time to take land, the chances of mobilization securing the front in Russia for additional Ukrainian losses exist as well. Further, the global economy will have a slower growth, food scarcity will continue to rise, and any potential actions in other conflicts by the United States or agreements involving Russia are improbable. Finally, the new economy between Russia and China will grow, weakening US global control as Russia becomes the underling of China, the bigger threat to the United States.
5. Full territorial control or the ousting of the wildly popular Zelensky are the only ways that Russia could achieve absolute victory. The former seems to not be Russia's goal any longer, and the latter is unlikely due to the entrenchment of the Ukrainian government with its people. The Ukrainian military is also more capable than ever of harassing any gained territory due to equipment and training given by the NATO-sphere. The Ukraine cannot possible achieve absolute victory either due to the overwhelming force and size of Russia, especially its navy and air force, which have not seen significant losses when compared to the army. Absolute victory for the Ukraine would entail the reconquest of all 2014 territory and the ousting of Putin, but the next leader is possibly no less likely to continue the war. The most likely resolution will be negotiated.
6. An armistice would only stop conventional warfare. Economic and political warfare would still be on the table between Russia and the Ukraine, and they would be far more likely to escalate. Russia's new but internationally unrecognized line of control would likely function similarly to that between East and West Germany, having very little trade across and high militarization.
7. A peace treaty would be ideal, having a strong foundation for continued peace and normalizing relations between the two states through the addressing of shared disagreements, but it's unlikely to address every issue. Any peace treaty between Russia and the Ukraine will likely end somewhere between an armistice and peace treaty, as most do.
8. However, a peace treaty is very unlikely in the near future, but it could be used as a stepping stone to a broader agreement between Russia and the NATO-sphere to prevent future wars.
9. The most important thing is to end the war as soon as possible, especially to prevent nuclear exchange. While it's favorable for the Ukraine to take as much territory as possible, it is better if they did not take anything of strategic importance to Russia, especially 2014 territory, as the risk of escalation would spike. However, it does not matter how much territory Russia takes as long as the Ukraine exists, for its economy can recover.
10 (the rest of the paper). Both sides are too optimistic about their version of the war's outcome. The NATO-sphere should make a detailed and consistent plan of aid to the Ukraine. However, it should make this aid conditional on the grounds of their discussion of peace with Russia. Whether the unfulfillment of this condition should result in the leveling or decreasing of aid is unknown. Additionally, the Ukraine's government must announce its neutrality independently, but the United States and/or NATO-sphere should have a bi-lateral security agreement. To establish this, NATO should be reformed to some extent to limit its open door membership policy.